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INTRODUCTION 
In the earliest days of his presidency, Donald Trump issued 
an executive order that exemplifies a common attitude toward 
regulation today. President Trump ordered federal administra-
tive agencies to revoke at least two regulations for every one 
they issued and to cut regulatory costs without considering the 
benefits lost.1 The order is a blunt instrument, predicated on the 
assumption that, when it comes to regulation, less is necessarily 
more. A similar vision, but better explained and more qualified, 
animates Professor Thomas Lambert’s book. 
How to Regulate: A Guide for Policymakers offers decision-
making principles for a policymaker who is trying to decide 
whether and how to address a problem through regulation. 
Lambert’s prescription for policymakers is simple to state, 
though hard to apply: policymakers should strive to minimize 
the sum of decision costs (the costs of making a decision) and er-
ror costs (the costs of making the wrong decision) (pp 12–13). 
Lambert would have policymakers apply cost-benefit analysis in 
calculating these costs, and he would have them pick the option 
that maximizes the net quantified, monetized benefits (p 13). 
Three basic choices shape Lambert’s policy guidance. First, 
Lambert targets his advice to all “policymakers” alike, and he 
defines “policymaker” broadly to include anyone who shapes or 
even considers regulatory policy, ranging from a citizen casting 
a vote, to a student of public policy, to an agency head  
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implementing a legislative directive (pp ix–x). Second, Lambert 
would have policymakers minimize decision costs and error costs 
only for “regulation” as he defines it. In Lambert’s usage, “regu-
lation” is a “threat-backed government directive” that aims to 
increase overall wealth by correcting a “defect in private order-
ing” (p 4). Moreover, regulation, for Lambert, does not include 
the common law, much of the criminal law, most of the tax code, 
or intellectual property law (pp 4–5, 8, 67–68). The legal rules 
excluded from Lambert’s conception of regulation would not 
need to pass through the cost-benefit gauntlet he would erect for 
regulation as he defines it. Third, Lambert aims to maximize 
human welfare, as measured by overall wealth (p 253). Policy-
makers who follow his advice in choosing among regulatory op-
tions will treat all types of regulatory errors as equally bad. 
They may also prize total wealth above all and relegate any con-
cerns about the distribution of wealth to “direct redistribution” 
rather than addressing them through regulation as Lambert de-
fines it (pp 4–5, 253–56). 
In this Book Review, I argue that these central features of 
Lambert’s book—the sweeping view of the “policymaker” who 
should take his advice, the skewed definition of the “regulation” 
to which his advice applies, and the treasuring of total wealth 
before all else in the regulatory system—are also its central  
defects. 
Directing the same decision-making guidance to all those 
who play any role in government ignores the differing legal con-
straints of these diverse actors. A voter need not apply any legal 
constraint to her preference for a particular candidate. A mem-
ber of the legislature may forthrightly reject existing statutes in 
favor of new approaches. But the people largely making the de-
cisions Lambert discusses—the leaders and staffs of agencies 
charged with administering regulatory statutes—are con-
strained by the limits of those underlying statutes. They are not 
free to pick among the relatively narrow regulatory options 
Lambert favors. To ignore these constraints is effectively to ig-
nore the role of law in our regulatory system. 
Defining the regulation subject to the intensive economic 
analysis Lambert embraces to exclude the common law, criminal 
law, the tax code, and intellectual property law tilts the playing 
board steeply against regulatory interventions that disrupt tra-
ditional legal solutions and sanctifies existing structures of 
wealth distribution. For example, tax breaks for the fossil fuel 
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industry need not, in Lambert’s scheme, pass the strict cost-
benefit test he would impose on regulation. Legally required  
pollution controls for this industry, however, would need to sur-
vive his cost-benefit gauntlet. Common law rules that limit the 
ability of workers to sue for workplace injuries would bypass 
Lambert’s criterion of economic efficiency, while agency rules 
aimed at preventing workplace injuries would not. There is no 
sense in this scheme unless one’s aim is to permit as little devia-
tion as possible from existing arrangements. 
Regulation achieves success in Lambert’s framework when 
it minimizes error costs and decision costs (pp 12–13) and max-
imizes wealth (p 253). Yet not all error costs are the same, and 
overall wealth does not equate with overall welfare. Only in the 
first (pp 5–6) and last (pp 253–56) pages of the book does  
Lambert acknowledge that his analytical framework does not 
make room for fairness or the distribution of wealth. The eco-
nomic analysis to which Lambert would subject “regulation” 
aims only at increasing overall wealth, not at spreading it.  
Lambert allows that a regulator may consider fairness, but he 
admits that trying to do so in any systematic fashion is beyond 
the scope of his analysis and thus makes no attempt to under-
take this critical step. As a result, Lambert counsels only that 
regulators considering fairness should do so with “eyes open” to 
the “wealth they’re sacrificing” (pp 253–54). He writes: 
“[R]egulation is frequently a clumsy tool for achieving distribu-
tional objectives. Often, the better approach is to regulate so as 
to maximize social welfare and then just engage in direct redis-
tribution to achieve an outcome that is deemed to be equitable” 
(pp 253–54). In an age when the top 1 percent of households hold 
a greater share of this country’s wealth than the bottom 90 per-
cent combined,2 it is hard to love a regulatory framework that 
puts off fairness for another day. 
In the end, How to Regulate is actually a book about how not 
to regulate: by requiring neutral-sounding, hard-to-satisfy ana-
lytical tests as a precondition for regulation, Lambert offers pol-
icymakers a way to avoid regulation in all but the most extreme 
cases while maintaining the façade of a protective regulatory 
system. If one were looking for a more time- and resource-
intensive way of achieving the severe results of President 
 
 2 See Christopher Ingraham, The Richest 1 Percent Now Owns More of the Coun-
try’s Wealth Than at Any Time in the Past 50 Years (Wash Post, Dec 6, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/3SV9-G3ZL. 
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Trump’s executive order on regulatory costs, Lambert’s frame-
work would not be a bad place to start. 
This Review has four parts. Part I describes Lambert’s sys-
tem for making regulatory decisions. Part II explains how  
Lambert’s system ignores legal constraints. Part III critiques 
Lambert’s narrow view of what counts as the “regulation” that is 
subject to his decision-making guide. Part IV critiques  
Lambert’s treatment of all error costs as the same and his posi-
tion on the primacy of wealth over fairness. 
I.  HOW TO REGULATE 
How to Regulate is, as the title indicates, a how-to manual 
for decision-making about regulation. The writing is clear, with 
plenty of vivid examples, references to current disputes, and 
even touches of humor. For one not already steeped in neoliberal 
regulatory theory, the book offers the possibility of a quick edu-
cation in this strain of policy analysis. For one who has been 
over this philosophical ground before, the book offers a refresher 
course with up-to-date illustrations drawn from diverse areas, 
including environmental law, securities regulation, and commu-
nications law. 
Professor Lambert’s book is aimed at “policymakers,” de-
fined as anyone with a role in government, however minimal or 
indirect. Voters, civil servants, undergraduates studying public 
policy, agency heads, and presidents are all policymakers in this 
framework (pp ix–x). Lambert would have the whole class of ac-
tors he regards as policymakers apply his prescriptions for sen-
sible regulation. These prescriptions include conducting an in-
tensive cost-benefit analysis of each potential policy choice and 
then selecting the choice that “minimizes the sum of error and 
decision costs” (p 13). 
Lambert would apply these policy prescriptions only to what 
he defines as “regulation” (pp 4–6). Lambert defines regulation 
as “threat-backed governmental directive[s] aimed at fixing a 
defect in ‘private ordering’” that reduces overall welfare (p 4). 
He defines private ordering as “the world that would exist if 
people did their own thing without government intervention be-
yond enforcing common law rights to person, property, and con-
tract” (p 4). In addition to the common law of tort, property, and 
contract, he also deems “the common law of crimes,” including 
“legislative codifications of common law rules, such as the lar-
ceny and rape provisions of state criminal codes” (p 8); “[m]ost 
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aspects of the basic federal income tax” (p 5); and intellectual 
property law (pp 67–68) to be outside the scope of the regulation 
that he aims to curtail. 
For Lambert, private ordering (as modified by the legal con-
straints he excludes from his definition of regulation) is the pre-
ferred state of affairs, and government-inspired deviations from 
private ordering are disfavored (p 16). Private ordering is pref-
erable, Lambert argues, because well-functioning markets will 
direct goods and resources to their highest and best use (pp 20–
21), as reflected in the willingness of individuals to pay for those 
goods and resources (p 18). Regulatory deviations from private 
ordering are susceptible to the problems of inadequate 
knowledge on the part of the government and rent-seeking be-
havior by outside interests and inside bureaucrats (pp 31–34). 
The substantive heart of Lambert’s book consists of six 
chapters in which he describes market failures, offers traditional 
potential remedies for those failures, describes the adverse con-
sequences that may attend those remedies, and provides a 
checklist for policymakers faced with each market failure 
(chs 4–9). These chapters begin with a simple, everyday example 
of the problem under discussion and then proceed—in the na-
ture of a physician examining a patient—to discuss the illness, 
treatment plan, and side effects for the market problem  
Lambert has identified. 
The market failures Lambert identifies include the classics: 
externalities, public goods, market power, and information 
asymmetry. He discusses agency costs as a byproduct of these 
market failures. In addition, Lambert discusses the basic in-
sights of behavioral economics and the role they may play in jus-
tifying and developing regulation (ch 9). He offers a quick and at 
times skeptical review of major findings in behavioral econom-
ics, such as framing effects, the endowment effect, and short-
term thinking (pp 226–28, 230–31). 
The remedies Lambert identifies for these failures are also 
familiar. They include command-and-control regulation (mostly 
technology-based regulation), Pigouvian taxes, the creation of 
property rights through such measures as emissions trading 
schemes, licensing, subsidies, bans, controls on market power, 
and disclosure requirements (pp 29–57). 
Lambert is preoccupied throughout this discussion with the 
challenges of knowledge and public choice. He is skeptical that 
government will be able to marshal the kind of information  
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necessary for well-informed and sensible regulation, especially 
because he would insist that the government possess and con-
sider a full inventory of the costs and benefits of all possible 
regulatory interventions before stepping in (pp 31–32). He is on 
the lookout for any opportunity for a stakeholder to secure  
benefits for itself in situations in which the stakeholder’s con-
centrated interest in the subject matter is matched only by a dif-
fuse public benefit. Such situations, Lambert argues, are full of 
potential for private interest deals at the expense of the broader 
public (pp 33–34). 
For Lambert, the way to choose among potential remedies, 
and indeed the way to choose any remedy at all beyond private 
ordering (as modified by the legal constraints he does not view 
as “regulation”), is to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of each reg-
ulatory possibility and pick the alternative that minimizes the 
sum of decision costs and error costs (p 13). Although he does 
not say so explicitly, his focus on decision costs and error costs 
pairs rather neatly with his focus on the knowledge problem 
(which increases both decision costs and error costs) and the 
public choice problem (which increases error costs due to rent-
seeking behavior). 
Lambert would not, however, choose a solution based simply 
on whether it produces more benefits than costs. Instead, he 
would “[p]ick the approach that minimizes the sum of error and 
decision costs” (p 13). Lambert illustrates his approach with a 
stylized example (p 13). A policymaker is faced with a choice be-
tween a rule that costs $60 million and produces $70 million in 
benefits and a rule that costs $25 million and produces $50 mil-
lion in benefits. This policymaker should not, Lambert argues, 
choose the rule that produces $70 million in benefits merely be-
cause its benefits are higher than its costs (p 13). Instead, the 
policymaker should choose the rule that produces $25 million in 
net benefits. Factoring in opportunity costs, that policymaker 
should reject the rule that produces larger gross benefits ($70 
million compared to $50 million) because, Lambert argues, that 
rule sacrifices “$25 million in benefits that could have been 
achieved” had the other policy been chosen instead (p 13  
(emphasis added)). He characterizes this analysis as minimizing 
the sum of decision costs and error costs (p 13). Of this ap-
proach, Lambert says, “At the end of the day, we’re still doing 
cost-benefit analysis; we’re just doing it better” (p 13). 
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In the last chapter, Lambert identifies two issues that he 
deliberately sidesteps in the rest of the book. These are the 
structure of the institutions that engage in regulatory activity 
and the role of fairness in regulatory regimes (pp 251–56). On 
institutions, Lambert believes that regulatory substance gener-
ally must come before regulatory process (p 251). His one sug-
gestion is to subject the independent federal agencies to the 
White House review process that uses cost-benefit analysis as a 
decision-making criterion (pp 252–53). On equity, Lambert con-
fesses that he simply does not know how to trade off fairness 
against wealth (p 256) and argues that even if many of us have a 
“taste” for equity (pp 254–56), we will want to know the effect of 
regulation on overall wealth before we sacrifice any of it in the 
name of fairness (p 256). He is not against redistribution; he 
simply takes no position on it (p 5). He allows that policymakers 
may choose to redistribute wealth directly, rather than through 
regulation as he defines it, but he offers no view as to whether 
they should do so (pp 5, 253–54). The book, Lambert confesses, 
“takes no position on the propriety of redistributive governmen-
tal commands; it just wouldn’t label them ‘regulation’” (p 5). 
II.  POLICYMAKERS AND THE LAW 
There is a disconnect at the heart of Professor Lambert’s 
book: few of the policymakers to whom Lambert directs his 
“Guide for Policymakers” are the people who actually regulate. 
A book can, of course, have multiple audiences, but in this case, 
the difference between the audience and the actors creates a 
fundamental gap: there is no obvious place for law in thinking 
through regulatory decisions using Lambert’s framework. In-
deed, throughout his analysis, Lambert does not acknowledge 
how much existing law constrains the use of economic analysis 
in setting regulatory policy. 
Among the clear targets of Lambert’s book are the adminis-
trative agencies that implement most of the regulatory strate-
gies in this country (p 4). These institutions, however, are not 
empowered to follow economic analysis wherever it may lead, as 
Lambert would have them do. They are also not empowered to 
stand down if they do not find one of the varieties of market 
failure Lambert identifies. In telling them first to identify a 
market failure and then to adopt one of the approved sets of 
remedies, Lambert ignores the constraints law places on the mo-
tivations and strategies for regulation. In many instances,  
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Congress has identified problems that agencies are not empow-
ered to ignore even if they do not amount to market failures, and 
it has required a decision-making framework different from the 
cost-benefit framework Lambert recommends. 
We can make these points concrete by examining a current 
regulatory dilemma. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
has the authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the 1970 
Amendments to the Clean Air Act3 (CAA).4 The EPA has found 
that greenhouse gases endanger public health and welfare within 
the meaning of the CAA.5 This finding obligates the EPA to regu-
late greenhouse gases under several provisions of the CAA.6 
In deciding what to do about the problem of greenhouse 
gases, the EPA is not empowered to decide that climate change 
does not reflect a defect in private ordering and that, therefore, 
the EPA may stand down. It is not empowered to decide that 
greenhouse gases, despite their harms to human health and 
welfare, are not externalities. It is also not empowered to run 
the gamut of the strategies Lambert suggests for dealing with 
externalities—command-and-control regulation, Pigouvian 
taxes, and emissions trading schemes—and pick whichever 
strategy it decides would best address the problem of climate 
change. It must find authority for its regulatory approach in the 
CAA itself.7 
The EPA has been through such an exercise, and its experi-
ence illustrates the limits law places on the agency’s freedom to 
pick and choose regulatory strategies in the way Lambert rec-
ommends. In formulating its initial rules for controlling emis-
sions of greenhouse gases from power plants—the so-called 
Clean Power Plan8—the EPA squarely faced the question of 
 
 3 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub L No 91-604, 84 Stat 1676 (1970), codified 
as amended at 42 USC § 7401 et seq. 
 4 See Massachusetts v EPA, 549 US 497, 532 (2007) (holding that greenhouse  
gases are air pollutants under the CAA). 
 5 See Environmental Protection Agency, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute 
Findings for Greenhouse Gases under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed Reg 
66496, 66499 (2009). 
 6 See, for example, 42 USC § 7521(a)(1) (directing the EPA Administrator to 
prescribe standards for air pollutants from motor vehicles once she determines that the 
pollutants endanger public health and welfare). 
 7 See, for example, Louisiana Public Service Commission v Federal  
Communications Commission, 476 US 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency literally has no 
power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”). 
 8 Environmental Protection Agency, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Ex-
isting Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed Reg 64662 (2015), 
amending 40 CFR Part 60. 
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what regulatory strategies were open to the agency under the 
Act. No one seriously argued that the CAA authorized the EPA 
to develop a Pigouvian tax for greenhouse gas emissions from 
power plants. The argument, instead, was between a command-
and-control regime that would require technological improve-
ments, plant by plant, and a more flexible framework that would 
allow states to seek improvements across the range of players in 
the energy industry.9 
The EPA chose the latter approach, opting for a rule that 
looked beyond technological enhancements within a particular 
power facility to improvements “beyond-the-fenceline” in the 
larger energy system.10 In choosing this approach, the EPA  
opted for the better approach according to Lambert’s frame-
work—not technology-based command-and-control regulation, 
and not a Pigouvian tax, but a flexible regime that rewarded en-
vironmental improvement even as it allowed compliance at  
lower costs.11  
Here, however, the same industry players that had previ-
ously supported more flexible regulatory approaches brought a 
legal challenge to the EPA’s choice of regulatory strategies and 
ultimately succeeded in winning a stay from the US Supreme 
Court (though the legal reasons for the Court’s stay were never 
disclosed).12 
The EPA was never free, legally, to simply survey the 
landscape of potential regulatory interventions and pick the one 
that comported best with the economic analysis Lambert favors. 
The CAA does not offer, as regulatory possibilities, the full array 
of regulatory approaches Lambert identifies. While Lambert’s 
advice may be useful to legislators designing a regulatory 
statute or to policy students trying to master economic theories 
 
 9 See Respondent EPA’s Opposition to Motions to Stay Final Rule, West Virginia v 
Environmental Protection Agency, No 15-1363, *4–6, 28–31 (DC Cir filed Dec 3, 2015) 
(describing the EPA’s statutory authority under the CAA and arguing that it includes 
performance measures that go beyond the boundaries of individual plants). 
 10 See Legal Memorandum Accompanying the Clean Power Plan for Certain Issues 
*17 (Environmental Protection Agency, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ZMW8-VLMY. 
 11 See id at *39 (“Among other things, these mechanisms create economic incen-
tives that reward over-performance of some sources, allow others to simply acquire cred-
its or allowances to comply with their emission standard, and avoid the need for installa-
tion of costly pollution controls at sources on a short time horizon.”). 
 12 Order, Chamber of Commerce v EPA, No 15-1363 (2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/X4NW-8YJC. For a critique of the Court’s stay, see generally Lisa  
Heinzerling, The Supreme Court’s Clean-Power Power Grab, 28 Georgetown Envir L Rev 
425 (2016). 
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of regulation, it is far less helpful to the people who actually 
develop regulations. 
In ignoring legal constraints, Lambert manages also to ig-
nore the legislative judgments that underlie those constraints. 
Many federal statutes prescribe the technology-based,  
command-and-control regulation Lambert disfavors.13 They do 
so, moreover, precisely to minimize the kinds of decision costs 
that Lambert emphasizes. Congress has long recognized that 
calculating the costs and benefits of regulatory policies is oner-
ous and uncertain and instead has embraced technology-based 
regulation as a way of avoiding the knowledge problem Lambert 
identifies.14 
The major federal environmental statutes illustrate this 
point. The Clean Water Act15 opted to start the regulatory 
process for water pollution control with technology-based 
regulation, rather than harm-based regulation, in part because 
it had proven too difficult to calculate the harms caused by 
water pollution.16 In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,17 
Congress moved toward a technology-based approach and away 
from a cost-benefit approach to regulating hazardous air 
pollutants that had effectively paralyzed the regulatory process, 
producing regulation of only seven hazardous air pollutants in 
twenty years.18 The cost-benefit language of the Toxic 
Substances Control Act19 (TSCA), as interpreted in a judicial 
decision invalidating the EPA’s ban on asbestos,20 helped to 
 
 13 For examples of statutes that use technology-based standards, see Wendy E. 
Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U Ill L Rev 83, 85 n 7. 
 14 Id at 93 (describing how technology-based standards make use of the greater 
knowledge possessed by regulated entities). 
 15 Federal Water Pollution Act Amendments of 1972, Pub L No 92-500, 86 Stat 816 
(1972), codified at 33 USC § 1251 et seq. 
 16 See Environmental Protection Agency v California, 426 US 200, 202–05 (1976) 
(“[The old regulations made] it very difficult to develop and enforce standards. . . . [A] 
discharger’s performance is now measured against strict technology-based effluent limi-
tations—specified levels of treatment—to which it must conform, rather than against 
limitations derived from water quality standards.”) 
 17 Pub L No 101-549, 104 Stat 2399, codified as amended in various sections of  
Titles 29 and 42. 
 18 See Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 Wm & Mary L Rev 1933, 1992 (2017). 
 19 Pub L No 94-469, 90 Stat 2003 (1976), codified at 15 USC § 2601 et seq. 
 20 See Corrosion Proof Fittings v Environmental Protection Agency, 947 F2d 1201, 
1229 (5th Cir 1991) (“[The EPA’s] explicit failure to consider the alternatives required of 
it by Congress deprived its final rule of the reasonable basis it needed to survive judicial 
scrutiny.”). 
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stultify the EPA’s regulatory program for toxic chemicals.21 In 
2016, Congress amended the TSCA to soften the cost-benefit 
requirements that had been imposed under the original 
statute.22 
Lambert not only fails to grapple with the legislative 
judgments underlying such statutes, but he also fails to see how 
they mitigate the knowledge problem he worries about. Lambert 
argues that a policymaker choosing to regulate through 
technology-based regulation must first calculate all of the costs 
and benefits of such regulation (p 31). For this reason, Lambert 
concludes that the knowledge problem is at least as severe for 
technology-based regulation as it is for the alternatives (p 32). 
But this is only because Lambert has ignored the fact that 
Congress usually does not require cost-benefit analysis for 
technology-based regulation.23 Lambert may disagree with the 
policy choice of eschewing cost-benefit–based decision-making, 
but he is incorrect to assume that technology-based regulation 
necessarily entails cost-benefit analysis. It does not, and from 
the perspective of decision costs, this is an advantage. 
The solution to a misalignment between the actual policy-
maker in agencies and Lambert’s proposal is simple: add a step 
to his analytical framework. As it stands, Lambert’s analysis 
first identifies some issue and then weighs the costs and benefits 
of potential solutions (pp 14–15). But before identifying solu-
tions, the policymaker should ask how existing law constrains 
her decision on regulation. Many of the regulatory options  
Lambert favors—including doing nothing—would fall away after 
this step. At that point, of course, Lambert might argue in favor 
of changing the underlying law to bring it more in line with  
neoliberal economics. But there is a big difference between start-
ing with respectful attention to statutory constraints and acting 
as though they do not exist. 
 
 21 See Daniel A. Farber, Book Review, Rethinking the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
76 U Chi L Rev 1355, 1380–81, 1383 (2009) (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s ruling that the 
EPA’s ban on asbestos had not adequately considered costs and benefits of less burden-
some alternatives, leading to “the agency abandon[ing] the use of [the provision at  
issue]” after the decision).  
 22 See Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act § 6, Pub L No 
114-182, 130 Stat 448, 460 (2016), codified at 15 USC § 2605. 
 23 See generally Sidney A. Shapiro and Thomas O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: 
The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 Duke L Rev 729 (arguing that it is 
both reasonable and faithful to Congress’s objectives for the agency to implement  
technology-based standards without conducting cost-benefit analysis). 
2026 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:2015 
	
III.  WHAT IS REGULATION? 
In Professor Lambert’s framework, some government deci-
sions may proceed without cost-benefit analysis and without at-
tention to the balance of decision costs and error costs, while 
others may proceed only after satisfying demanding economic 
tests. Lambert’s framework thus favors the former kinds of gov-
ernment decisions over the latter. Yet Lambert has not ade-
quately justified giving some kinds of government decisions a 
free pass and subjecting others to a demanding cost-benefit test. 
The legal system that would result from his preferred decision-
making framework would be inherently skewed against reforms 
aimed at correcting inadequacies in the traditional common law 
and criminal law systems. In this way, Lambert’s framework 
calls to mind the laissez-faire approaches of the early twentieth 
century, which also gave a free pass to traditional legal frame-
works while resisting efforts to address, through regulation, the 
problems they had created. 
The only policy choices that Lambert would subject to his 
intensive economic analysis are those that involve regulation as 
he defines it (p 6). Government actions that do not involve regu-
lation in Lambert’s sense get a free pass. The dividing line  
Lambert erects between regulation and other government con-
duct is not neutral. It favors stasis over change and keeps 
wealth in the hands of those who already have plenty of it even 
as it would bless greater redistributions from the less to the 
more advantaged. 
Lambert’s definition of regulation excludes the common law, 
much of the criminal law, most of the tax code, and intellectual 
property law, leaving uncovered much government action that 
licenses or constrains private conduct. While he characterizes 
these areas of the law as “private ordering” (pp 4, 16, 68), they 
consist of legal licenses and legal constraints created by the gov-
ernment. These laws result in orders and rules backed by the 
force of law. These legal instruments are not private ordering; 
they are public ordering. Lambert may well be comfortable with 
these specific forms of public ordering, but that comfort does not 
convert these legal constraints into private ordering. 
It is not exactly clear why Lambert takes these legal  
licenses and constraints created by the government outside the 
category of regulation. It seems to have something to do, first, 
with the perceived antiquity, efficiency, and purpose of the rules 
in question. The common law of contracts, torts, and property, 
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Lambert reports, have been with us for “centuries” (p 4 n 3). In-
tellectual property protections are not only in the Constitution 
but are “ancient” and have been “part of the legal landscape for 
centuries” (p 68). 
In addition, Lambert appears to believe that tort law and, it 
appears, most of “traditional” criminal law (p 7), involve rules 
that easily satisfy his criterion of economic efficiency. He offers 
the example of the law of battery: surely the batterer derives 
less in benefit from nonconsensual touching than the victim, her 
loved ones, and others suffer in harm (p 7). “[S]ome actions,” he 
explains, “always or almost always occasion net reductions in 
human welfare” (p 7) and, thus, are not the sorts of “mixed-bag” 
conduct that he says should concern modern regulators (p 8). 
As for the income tax, Lambert emphasizes that he is con-
cerned only with regulation that aims to correct a defect in pri-
vate ordering for the purpose of improving overall welfare. The 
income tax falls outside his framework because it is aimed at 
raising revenue and not at correcting such a defect (p 5). At 
times, he appears to allow that taxing activity that also has the 
purpose of correcting defects in private ordering (such as gaso-
line taxes aimed partly at controlling the externalities of carbon 
emissions) fall within his category of regulation (p 5), but he also 
appears quite confident that the “basic federal income tax” is 
outside of it (p 5). Redistribution, in Lambert’s scheme, is not a 
“‘regulatory’ objective” (p 5). 
These explanations for treating the common law, criminal 
law, intellectual property law, and tax law differently from, and 
more leniently than, other legal licenses and constraints—
regulation in Lambert’s sense—do not make sense. 
The antiquity of a legal rule—the fact that it has been with 
us “for centuries”—does not convert it into a private, nonregula-
tory matter. A rule does not become a matter of private ordering 
just because it has been around a long time. It is not even clear, 
moreover, which principles from the common law, criminal law, 
or intellectual property law Lambert would retain without fur-
ther analysis. His nonspecific references to the “common law” 
and its antiquity seem to assume that the common law is a 
monolith, and an unchanging one at that. But this view glosses 
over the great variability in common law rules and the tendency 
of a common law system to evolve in the face of changing cir-
cumstances. The common law system is neither as ancient nor 
as static as Lambert makes it out to be. 
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Although Lambert does not identify the exact legal princi-
ples he would allow a policymaker to embrace without intensive 
economic analysis, his references to law that has existed for cen-
turies and to “traditional” legal principles give the strong im-
pression that he would not give contemporary common law, 
criminal law, or intellectual property law the same free pass. 
This approach sets the table nicely if one’s objective is to allow 
the regulatory system to change as little as possible in response 
to changing circumstances. One suspects, for example, that de-
spite Lambert’s consistently favorable invocation of nuisance 
law as a background principle that does not require a policy-
maker’s cost-benefit analysis (pp 47–49), he would probably not 
give a free pass to current lawsuits, sounding in public nuisance, 
that attempt to hold fossil fuel companies liable for their contri-
butions to global climate change.24 Yet these lawsuits draw on 
the same venerable nuisance law principles Lambert otherwise 
embraces. Lambert may like the common law system better 
when it addresses old problems with old principles than when it 
addresses new problems with old principles, but a principled  
basis for this preference does not appear in Lambert’s analysis. 
Perhaps one could argue that application of old principles to 
new problems is different, and belongs inside the category of 
regulation that Lambert would curtail, because individuals and 
entities will have made investment decisions based on a particu-
lar understanding of the existing legal regime. Application of old 
principles, such as sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (“so use 
your own so as not to injure another’s property”) (pp 29, 47 
n 19), to a new problem, or creation of a new principle to cover 
the new problem, might disrupt these settled expectations. In 
the case of climate change litigation, however, it seems unlikely 
that a polluter would be unfairly surprised. As the plaintiffs 
document in their complaints, the major fossil fuel companies 
have known for decades of the threats their products posed to 
the climate.25 
 
 24 For a brief discussion of several recent lawsuits, see Michael Burger, Do State 
Common Law Nuisance Claims for Climate Change-Related Harms Even Exist Anymore? 
(Columbia Law School Climate Law Blog, Sept 14, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/YY9Y-A3M4. 
 25 See, for example, Complaint, City of Richmond v Chevron Corp, No C18-00055, 
*1 (Cal Super filed Jan 22, 2018) (alleging that fossil fuel companies “have known for 
nearly a half century that unrestricted production and use of their fossil fuel products 
create greenhouse gas pollution that warms the planet and changes our climate”). 
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More fundamentally, the very nature of the common law 
system is to apply old principles to new problems and to incen-
tivize parties creating new problems to consider the effects on 
others when they do so. To argue that the common law system, 
which Lambert excludes from his definition of regulation, must 
not address new problems, or adjust its principles to take ac-
count of new problems, would simply prove my central point: 
Lambert’s framework favors stasis over change even as we en-
counter new problems. 
Nor does efficiency clearly favor the common law and crimi-
nal law over regulation as Lambert understands it. These sys-
tems often address the same kind of behavior. If battery “always 
or almost always occasion[s] net reductions in human welfare” 
(p 7), it does so whether it is being licensed or constrained by a 
common law system or by a regulatory system. However,  
Lambert would treat these systems very differently. Rules about 
battery set by common law judges would escape Lambert’s cost-
benefit constraint, but rules about battery set by administrative 
regulators would fall within it. Thus, a judge could impose liabil-
ity for nonconsensual touching in the context of sexual harass-
ment, and she would not need to tally the costs and benefits of 
allowing, or not allowing, nonconsensual touching before doing 
so. Yet if the Department of Education develops a policy on ad-
dressing sexual harassment at colleges and universities, the 
agency would need to run Lambert’s cost-benefit gauntlet. Bat-
tery’s harms to human welfare, however, do not depend on the 
nature of the governmental institution addressing them. 
In fact, running the harms of battery through the cost-
benefit gauntlet Lambert favors may well end up reversing his 
basic insight that battery “always or almost always occasion[s] 
net reductions in human welfare” (p 7). It is not clear that a 
cost-benefit analysis of battery would “always or almost always” 
work out against battery. The transformation of battery from an 
“always or almost always” bad event to one that might be bad, or 
not, depending on how cost-benefit analysis turns out, does not 
have to do with the nature of battery; it has to do with the limits 
of cost-benefit analysis. 
Consider the Department of Justice’s cost-benefit analysis of 
measures to reduce the incidence of rape and other forms of  
2030 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:2015 
	
sexual abuse in prisons.26 In conducting an economic analysis of 
its regulations implementing the Prison Rape Elimination Act,27 
the Department of Justice endeavored to calculate the monetary 
value of preventing rape and other forms of sexual abuse. It did 
so by asking how much the victims of rape and abuse would pay 
to avoid rape and abuse and also how much they would pay to 
accept rape and abuse.28 Its analysis culminated in a “hierarchy” 
of values associated with seventeen different varieties of rape 
and sexual abuse.29 The whole premise of the agency’s compli-
cated economic analysis was that rape and sexual abuse in  
prison may not, in fact, “always or almost always” occasion a net 
reduction in human welfare; the assumption is that to know 
whether they do, one must first run the cost-benefit numbers. 
The simple assertion Lambert offers in defense of the common 
law of battery—that it “always or almost always occasion[s] net 
reductions in human welfare” (p 7)—is not admissible, without 
complicated economic analysis, in a cost-benefit system. 
Do not misunderstand me. I am not advocating for more 
cost-benefit analysis of rape and sexual abuse. I am pointing out 
that the nature of the object of the government’s interest—
battery—does not change depending on whether one is in a 
court-centered, common law system or in an agency-centered, 
regulatory system. If one’s intuition is, like Lambert’s, that 
common law battery “always or almost always occasion[s] net 
reductions in human welfare,” why would one listen to that intu-
ition less when one moves from a court to an administrative 
agency? And more pointedly, why would one discard it in favor 
of an analytical framework that changes the very nature of the 
wrong in the rape and sexual abuse context from one based on a 
lack of consent to one in which the calculations of willingness to 
pay and willingness to accept depend on an assumption of vol-
untariness?30 It is not that Lambert’s intuitions about the conse-
quences of battery are incorrect; it is that he should listen to 
them even when he turns to “regulation” as he understands it. 
 
 26 See Regulatory Impact Assessment for PREA Final Rule (US Department of  
Justice, May 17, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/73A2-ECDF. 
 27 Pub L No 108-79, 117 Stat 972 (2003), codified at 34 USC § 30301 et seq. 
 28 See Regulatory Impact Assessment at *42–46 (cited in note 26). 
 29 See id at *63. 
 30 See Lisa Heinzerling, Quality Control: A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 102 Cal L 
Rev 1457, 1465–67 (2014) (describing the conceptual incoherence of monetizing the 
harms from rape). 
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Regulatory purpose also does not convincingly distinguish 
the legal principles Lambert would subject to stricter scrutiny 
from the ones he would not. As I have noted, Lambert does not 
regard most of tax law as “regulatory” because he does not re-
gard government action with a redistributive purpose as regula-
tory (p 5). As a result, massive tax giveaways to the rich at the 
expense of the poor, done for the “redistributive” purpose of 
shifting more money to the rich, would completely evade  
Lambert’s analytical structure. Meanwhile, “regulation” amelio-
rating the consequences of this maldistribution would be subject 
to a strict cost-benefit test. Tax breaks and giveaways for the 
fossil fuel industry, for example, would survive without resort to 
cost-benefit analysis, but “regulation” aiming to tame the exter-
nalities imposed by this industry would need to pass through 
the cost-benefit sieve. Again, there is no apparent principle un-
derlying the division of government activities into “regulation” 
and “not regulation.” 
Worse still, tax policies that benefit polluting industries 
would escape Lambert’s cost-benefit test only if they aim at re-
distribution and not also at correcting for market defects (p 5). 
In this framework, tax breaks and subsidies to polluting indus-
tries would escape the cost-benefit test so long as their goal is 
simply to transfer money to wealthy industry players. If they 
are designed also to address externalities—as is Lambert’s fre-
quent foil, the tax break for electric vehicles (p 44)—then they 
will be subject to a cost-benefit test (p 5). By effectively favoring 
redistributive special interest deals over other forms of govern-
ment intervention, Lambert’s analytical structure encourages 
the very public choice distortions he claims to want to avoid. 
One might attempt to draw a bright line between the legal 
licenses and constraints imposed by the common law, criminal 
law, intellectual property law, and tax law and those created by 
“regulation” by arguing that the former are predominantly the 
work of legislatures and courts, while the latter are predomi-
nantly the work of administrative agencies. Lambert himself 
does not draw the line in this way, however, as he includes some 
of the work of legislatures (p 4) and courts (p 8) within his con-
cept of regulation. In any event, such a distinction would not 
justify Lambert’s dichotomous scheme. The work of agencies is 
the work of legislatures; agencies have no power to act unless 
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they are given a statutory charge.31 And even if one might be 
worried about the electoral accountability of agencies as com-
pared to legislatures, one should presumably be even more wor-
ried about the complete unaccountability of the courts. Yet 
court-created common law rules largely escape Lambert’s eco-
nomic scrutiny. Institutional differences between the kinds of 
legal judgments Lambert presumptively accepts and those he 
presumptively rejects do not justify this differential treatment. 
The common law, criminal law, intellectual property law, 
and tax law are part of the legal backdrop that licenses or cre-
ates market defects, such as externalities and market power. 
Subjecting efforts to depart from these laws to a demanding 
cost-benefit test would skew the regulatory system in favor of 
common-law principles worked out “centuries” ago and redis-
tributive systems that helped create and help to maintain the 
unprecedentedly privileged 1 percent. Before even one economist 
sets pen to paper to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of a given 
regulation, Lambert’s policy framework has rigged the system 
against change. As I discuss next, his favored form of economic 
analysis only deepens this bias. 
IV.  UNEQUAL ERRORS 
Two forms of false equivalence mar Professor Lambert’s 
brand of economic analysis. The first is the treatment of all error 
costs as equally problematic. The second is the equation of indi-
vidual welfare and overall wealth. 
In advising decision-makers to minimize the sum of decision 
costs and error costs, Lambert treats all error costs as equally 
bad (p 13). He does not make room for differential treatment of 
error costs when some unexpected outcomes are worse than oth-
ers. Many regulatory regimes, however, are predicated on an as-
sumption that some outcomes are worse than others even if they 
have the same “expected value,” calculated by multiplying the 
magnitude of harm by its probability.  
A good deal of federal environmental legislation embraces 
this kind of perspective. Most federal environmental laws take a 
“precautionary” stance insofar as they authorize agencies to 
regulate even before the scientific evidence of harms to humans 
 
 31 See note 7 and accompanying text. 
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and the environment is certain.32 They are sensitive to the pos-
sibility of an environmental event that, while unlikely, may be 
catastrophic. They envision stringent, technology-based regula-
tion even when the harms of pollution are difficult or even im-
possible to quantify.33 Federal environmental laws, in other 
words, treat the “error cost” of not regulating stringently enough 
as graver than the “error cost” of regulating too much. The same 
can be said for other forms of regulation, such as financial regu-
lation aimed at preventing another economic disaster on the or-
der of the recent recession.34 
Lambert’s analytical framework does not make room for 
such judgments. In this way, it ignores not only the congression-
al judgments behind a good deal of regulatory legislation but  
also the shortcomings of economic analysis itself. Economic 
analysis as currently structured has a hard time with low-
probability, high-magnitude events.35 Catastrophes can be flat-
tened out, made apparently acceptable, simply by multiplying a 
terrible amount of harm by a low chance. That does not mean 
that is the right or only way to look at them. One could just as 
rationally decide that the best thing to do is avoid these catas-
trophes. Lambert’s system does not allow this possibility. 
Treating all error costs in the same way also fails to account 
for the unequal difficulty of calculating the benefits as opposed 
to the costs of regulation. Calculating regulatory costs typically 
involves tallying up the out-of-pocket costs to businesses of 
complying with new rules—the costs of buying and operating 
new equipment, doing extra recordkeeping, paying higher 
salaries, and the like. These are expenditures that are naturally 
stated in monetary terms; they are bought with dollars. They 
also do not extend over decades, for the most part, and certainly 
not centuries. They do not involve deeply philosophical 
 
 32 See, for example, Lead Industries Association v Environmental Protection  
Agency, 647 F2d 1130, 1155 (DC Cir 1980) (embracing the EPA’s precautionary approach 
to setting national air quality standards under the CAA). 
 33 See, for example, 42 USC § 7412(d) (establishing a technology-based approach for 
hazardous air pollutants under the CAA). 
 34 See Frank Ackerman, Worst-Case Economics: Extreme Events in Climate and 
Finance 2–4, 121–29 (Anthem Press 2017) (“Quantitative cost-benefit analysis fails for 
the most serious financial and climate risks because meaningful predictions for average 
or expected losses do not, and cannot, exist. The same may be true for other catastrophic 
threats as well.”). 
 35 See Lisa Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman, Law and Economics for a Warming 
World, 1 Harv L & Pol Rev 331, 334 (2007) (discussing the difficulty of calculating the 
probability of catastrophic climate outcomes and, therefore, the costs of climate change). 
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questions like how much is life worth or how much of the future 
can we afford?36 There is little reason to believe that calculations 
of regulatory costs are systematically skewed to the low end, and 
indeed, there is some reason to believe they are skewed in the 
other direction.37 
Regulatory benefits are often different. They involve goods 
and resources—life, health, ecosystems—that are not naturally 
stated in monetary terms. In the environmental realm, they also 
extend into the far future.38 Calculating the benefits of reducing 
greenhouse gases, for example, has entailed conducting an 
economic analysis that tries to peer into the future—three 
centuries out.39 Not only does this challenge mightily any efforts 
at accurate prediction, but it also unleashes the deregulatory 
power of a cost-benefit analysis feature that Lambert only 
glancingly touches upon: the discounting of future benefits to 
present value. 
If applied at a positive rate over any appreciable period of 
time, discounting shrivels the apparent value of future benefits. 
Through discounting, enormous catastrophes in the far future 
become trivialities.40 Lambert’s failure to acknowledge the dis-
torting effects of discounting on the calculation of regulatory 
benefits is all the more surprising given that his only extended 
treatment of discounting comes in his discussion of “cognitive 
limitations and behavioral quirks” (pp 226–28). He does not note 
the disconnect between his embrace of traditional cost-benefit 
analysis (which employs exponential discounting) in the bulk of 
 
 36 See Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of 
Everything and the Value of Nothing 9 (New Press 2004) (“The basic problem with nar-
row economic analysis of health and environmental protection is that human life, health, 
and nature cannot be described meaningfully in monetary terms; they are priceless. . . . 
A different way of thinking is required.”). 
 37 See Thomas O. McGarity and Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, 
Safety, and Environmental Regulation, 80 Tex L Rev 1997, 2042–49 (2002) (describing 
how the methodology of cost-benefit analysis systematically inflates prospective cost  
estimates). 
 38 See Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 
Georgetown L J 2025, 2064–69 (1999) (describing how environmental regulations benefit 
a remote future).  
 39 See Technical Support Document: Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon 
for Regulatory Impact Analysis under Executive Order 12866 *9 (Interagency Working 
Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, Aug 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/ZS2L-
BBU3 (noting that the time horizon for analysis extended to the year 2300). 
 40 See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L J 1981, 
2049 (1998) (observing that, at a discount rate of 5 percent, it is considered better to save 
one life next year than a billion lives five hundred years from now). 
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the book and his suggestion, at the end of the book, that hyper-
bolic discounting may reflect a cognitive limitation or behavioral 
shortcoming. At the very least, Lambert could have explained 
why the large variance in revealed discount rates, both across 
individuals and within individuals across time periods (p 227), 
should not lead to equally variable discount rates in cost-benefit 
analysis. And he could have explained why the failure of self-
discipline, uncovered by high individual discount rates (pp 227–
28), should be uncritically replicated in a regulatory system. 
Giving equal billing, in a cost-benefit analysis, to the error 
costs of regulating less and to the error costs of regulating more 
does not account for the special challenges of quantifying and 
monetizing many regulatory benefits. It also does not account 
for the distortions introduced by discounting. 
Lambert tilts the scales even further against regulation 
when he insists on a decision-making framework that 
maximizes net benefits rather than one that allows choice 
among the options that produce any net benefits (p 13). As noted 
earlier, Lambert argues that a policymaker faced with a choice 
between a rule that costs $60 million and produces $70 million 
in benefits and a rule that costs $25 million and produces $50 
million in benefits should choose the latter rule (p 13). He 
argues that the rule that produces larger gross benefits ($70 
million compared to $60 million) actually fails cost-benefit 
analysis because it “would impose costs of . . . $25 million in 
benefits that could have been achieved” had the other policy 
been chosen instead (p 13). Lambert’s reasoning is misleading. 
Choosing the approach that produces higher gross benefits 
overall does not mean losing any benefits (or in Lambert’s 
terminology, imposing costs in terms of benefits forgone). It does 
mean spending more, but that extra spending is still a net 
improvement and may be favored for reasons not reflected in the 
limited analysis. In erroneously stating that the choice of the 
option with the greatest gross benefits actually results in a loss 
of benefits, Lambert avoids facing the actual consequence of his 
preferred decision-making test: in the scenario he envisions, his 
test will prefer minimizing costs over maximizing benefits. 
Lambert offers no argument as to why we should construct a 
regulatory system based on this preference.  
The second false equivalence in Lambert’s decision- 
making framework is the equation of individual welfare and 
overall wealth. In Lambert’s system, regulators should strive to 
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maximize welfare (p 6), by which he means they should maxim-
ize overall wealth (p 253). As he puts it, his analysis “generally 
assume[s] that the objective of regulatory interventions is to 
make society as a whole as wealthy as possible” (p 253). In  
Lambert’s framework, policymakers may, after calculating the 
effect of potential regulatory interventions on overall wealth, de-
cide to take fairness into account and seek a different course 
from the one suggested by the goal of maximizing overall wealth 
(pp 254–56). But they do not need to do this, and nothing in 
Lambert’s framework helps them decide how to do so (p 256). 
As economically minded policy analysts have done for 
years,41 Lambert suggests that, in any event, the better way to 
redistribute income is through the tax system rather than 
through the regulatory system: “[R]egulate so as to maximize 
social welfare,” he advises, “and then just engage in redistribu-
tion to achieve an outcome that is deemed equitable” (p 254 
(emphasis added)). 
The telling word in the preceding sentence is “just.” It sug-
gests redistribution of wealth is simple, perhaps even inevitable. 
But we have been hearing this for decades: wait for wealth re-
distribution through the tax system, economic analysts have 
said; don’t try to squeeze worries about fairness or equality into 
the regulatory system.42 Don’t worry if the regulatory system 
makes inequality worse rather than better. In the meantime, 
while we have been waiting, wealth has become ever more con-
centrated.43 To be sure, the latest tax reform did indeed redis-
tribute wealth but in the opposite direction from the one econo-
mists have been telling us to wait for: it redistributed toward 
the wealthy and away from the less well off.44 In a country in 
which the richest 1 percent of families control 38 percent of the 
 
 41 See generally, for example, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Why the Legal Sys-
tem Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J L Stud 667 (1994). 
 42 See Zachary G. Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, 85 U Chi L Rev 1649, 1662–64 
(2018) (collecting sources).  
 43 Chad Stone, et al, A Guide to Statistics on Historical Trends in Income Inequality 
(Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Feb 16, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/R96E-
88ND (showing slower economic growth and rising inequality in the United States since 
the 1970s). 
 44 Distributional Effects of the Conference Agreement for H.R. 1, the “Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act” (Joint Committee on Taxation, Dec 18, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/22G2-TZ2X. 
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wealth,45 it has become ever less tenable to equate the wealth of 
the few with the welfare of the many. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Lambert has written a lucid instruction manual 
for policy analysts aiming to analyze “regulation” through the 
theoretical lens of neoliberal economics. His prescriptions fall 
short, however, in the real world of regulation. He ignores legal 
regimes that do not require the presence of one of his categories 
of market failure before the government may step in or that do 
not adopt his economic precepts as their governing decision-
making criteria. He selectively carves out a good deal of the reg-
ulatory system—certain common-law and criminal-law princi-
ples, intellectual property law, and the tax code—as exempt 
from the economic scrutiny he otherwise would require. And he 
puts to one side questions about the fairness of the regulatory 
system he is trying to construct. His instruction manual is of 
limited utility in guiding us through the regulatory system we 
have in the pressingly unequal world in which we live. 
 
 
 45 Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016: Evidence from the Survey of 
Consumer Finances *10–11 (Federal Reserve Bulletin, Sept 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/52YY-HT7K. 
